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4Introduction - The World Crisis
In his latest book published right at the beginning of 2008,  George So-ros  observed that the world  was  “in the midst of the worst financial crisis since the 1930s”. At one level of course Soros was right. Indeed, as he went on to point out  in almost excruciatingly painful detail, the 
financial crisis of which he spoke could be traced back to one single ‘tipping 
point’ month -  August 2007 -  when on the 6th American Home Mortgage 
filed for bankruptcy,  followed  on the 7th by the suspension of three 
investment funds run by the French Bank BNP Paribas,  on the 10th and 
13th when the European Central Bank pumped over 100 billion Euros into 
the banking system and money markets, and on the 17th when the Federal 
Reserve moved fast to cut the discount rate.  
Still, even the  shrewd  Soros (a former student of the LSE) could not have foreseen what followed. 
In fact, for one so often attacked for being too alarmist in the past, Soros was actually not alarmist 
enough and managed to get the crisis wrong in at least two very important respects. 
First, the world was not - as we have since discovered  – in the midst  of a crisis as he implied but 
rather only just at the beginning of one; and a  year on from when he  wrote,  it was fast becom-
ing obvious that it would not just  last for a few weeks or months  but  almost certainly for years.. 
Secondly, though  the crisis itself may have begun  in the financial  sector – hence its original desig-
nation as a ‘credit crunch’ - it rapidly spread to what is sometimes euphemistically  termed the ‘real’ 
world economy, nowhere more catastrophically than in the country where the original crisis  had be-
gun: the United States.  Here  the pace of  economic decline, and with it a collapse in confidence in 
the American economic system was by any measure extraordinary. Nor were things any better across 
the Pacific. Indeed, for Japan  (still the second largest economy in the world in spite of China’s much-
vaunted ‘rise’) the outlook was much  worse and over a three month period between  September 
2008 and early 2009 it underwent a slump that set its economy back nearly 25 years – and this after a 
decade long  slowdown during the 1990s  that had already put paid to the always exaggerated idea 
that Japan might one day overtake the West. 
The situation was no better  in Europe or the UK. If anything things were just as critical, most 
ominously perhaps in  Britain where dependency  on  the housing market and the financial  sector 
made it especially vulnerable. The prospects for other European economies were not much better; 
indeed  in some like  Iceland, Ireland  and those of Central and East Europe,  they were a good deal 
worse. Even the so-called BRICs did not escape the storm. Certainly the virus-like character of the 
crisis has put paid to one  myth amongst many others: namely that the  emerging economies would 
remain relatively free of the economic problems facing the rest of the world. With unemployment 
rising rapidly in China and the collapse in oil prices  putting paid to Russia’s ambitions, there were  
few subscribers any longer to the notion that some parts of the international economy could remain 
aloof – or in the jargon ‘decoupled’ – from what was unfolding in the United States and Europe. 
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5The scale, the speed, the geographical spread, and perhaps above all, the almost complete failure 
of policy-makers and leading economists alike to see  the possibility of such a crisis ever taking place 
– though some very unpopular ‘whistleblowers had more than an inkling that the system was not 
viable – has forced everybody everywhere to rethink old assumptions and cast out traditional truths 
about the way in which  states and the international community do and should ‘do’  economics. 
But they had better think fast as our three contributors to this forum suggest.  With globalisation 
as described by Danny Quah now under threat,   and the stability of a number of countries  now in 
question, there is little time left to prevent the current crisis - whose gravity according to Howard 
Davies should not be understated -  from turning into a slump. We can only hope along with  David 
Held and Kevin Young that the world grasps the nettle and addresses the profound weaknesses that 
the current crisis have exposed in the structure of global governance. Whether it will,  and indeed 
whether this will prevent things from getting a lot worse,  remains to be seen. 
Versions of the papers contained in this Special Report were  presented 
at the “New World, New Capitalism” conference held in Paris in January 
2009, organized and hosted by the French government.  French President 
Nicholas Sarkozy set the tone for the meeting as he called on Old Europe 
to lead the discussions on the new world economy as a “narrative of 
the future”, and to re-found capitalism because “if we don’t do it, oth-
ers will do it in our place”. It is likely that the “others” he had in mind 
were those having meetings and working groups in Washington DC and 
New York; in fact, it was striking that the “American” view of capital-
ism presented in Paris remained clearly opposed to regulation and state 
intervention.
 
Europe did have something different to offer, and three specifically 
European themes emerged from the debate.  First, the state would be 
the only viable filter and guarantor for social justice. Second, the pres-
ence of labour unions in the debate was highly symbolic of the European 
trend to include “social partners”. Indeed, as this crisis has grown, labour 
unions and “workers” have reemerged onto the radar of economic and 
social policy. Third, the future lay with multilateralism. 
Indeed, Europe’s new message could be understood as “enough of one-
currency domination, would the dollar please make room for the euro”. 
That the non-Western world was underrepresented in Paris despite the 
organizers’ efforts to bring Africa, Asia and Latin America to the table is 
perhaps symptomatic of a response to a crisis that although truly global 
in scope has yet to embrace globalism. 
